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A Small Step Forward: The ALI
Domestic Partners Recommendation∗
Mark Strasser∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The American Law Institute (“ALI”) has recently recommended
that nonmarital, cohabiting couples should be presumed to have
taken on certain financial obligations with respect to each other, absent explicit agreement to the contrary. For example, if the parties
separate after having been together for a substantial period, one
partner may be ordered to pay support to the other partner, and
property acquired during the relationship will be presumed to belong
to both parties and, thus, will be subject to distribution. In essence,
the ALI recommendation treats the parties as married with regard to
their financial obligations to each other but treats the parties as unmarried with regard to third parties’ obligations to them.
Although the ALI recommendation has a variety of strengths and
deserves serious consideration, it is likely to generate some controversy. Some commentators are likely to suggest that the proposal
does not go far enough, since the proposal is “confined to the inter
se claims of domestic partners”1 and does not provide the basis for
any claims against any third parties.2 Others are likely to worry that
adoption of this proposal will adversely affect the traditional understanding of family. Those making this latter claim might have two
very different fears in mind: (1) that this change will induce couples
who otherwise would have married not to marry, and (2) that this
∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on February 1, 2001.
∗∗ Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. B.A. Harvard College; M.A.,
Ph.D. University of Chicago; J.D. Stanford Law School.
1. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) § 6.01 cmt. a [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4)].
2. See id. (“Nothing in this Chapter creates claims against any other persons or the
state.”).
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change will make nonmarital status too close to marital status and,
thus, will change the meaning of “marriage” or, perhaps, “family.”
Neither fear is well-founded, although for very different reasons.
This Article focuses on (1) why the ALI recommendation will neither undermine marriage nor the family, and (2) why adoption of
the ALI recommendation will promote fairness in many cases.
Adoption of the ALI recommendation regarding the dissolution
of domestic partnerships will not undermine the institutions of marriage and family because (1) the recommendation essentially reflects
developing state law in many respects, (2) to the extent that it does
not, the recommendation is unlikely to cause confusion either in the
courts or in society about what marriage and family mean, who in
fact is married, or what constitutes a family, and (3) the recommendation changes the current incentive structure in many states,
thereby making marriage more attractive. Because the ALI recommendation restricts itself to inter se benefits and because states already recognize claims of nonmarital partners to a share of the assets
acquired during the relationship, the ALI proposal is likely to have
relatively little effect on societal or legal understandings of marriage
but a potentially large effect on the lives of individual claimants.
Part II of this Article describes which couples can qualify as domestic partners and how domestic partnerships differ from marriages.
Part III discusses the policy and fairness considerations that militate
in favor of imposing financial obligations on domestic partners with
respect to one another and in favor of shifting the background presumptions regarding when the division of property or the provision
of support would appropriately be ordered upon dissolution of such
a relationship. Part IV discusses use of the contract paradigm to decide when support or a property division might be ordered, suggesting that although this model has certain advantages, the required
“meeting of the minds”3 poses unnecessary difficulties. Part V discusses the potential for conceptual confusion regarding which relationships are marriages and which are not. This section makes clear
that courts and society have had no difficulty in distinguishing between these different types of relationships and discusses how the
contract paradigm itself mischaracterizes the nonmarital cohabitant

3. Jacobson v. Gulbransen, 623 N.W.2d 84, 90 (S.D. 2001) (“To form a contract,
there must be a meeting of the minds or mutual assent on all essential terms.”) (citing Read v.
McKennan Hosp., 610 N.W.2d 782, 786 (S.D. 2000)).
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relationship in important respects. The article concludes that although there are weaknesses in the ALI proposal, it has a variety of
strengths and deserves serious consideration.
II. MARRIAGE AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP
The ALI domestic partnership proposal cannot be evaluated until
its basic elements are understood. The proposal permits a wide range
of couples to qualify for domestic partnership status as long as certain conditions have been met. However, the proposal makes clear
that domestic partnerships are not the equivalent of marriage and
that the latter has a variety of benefits that the former does not.
A. Who Are Domestic Partners?
Domestic partners are defined as “two persons of the same or
opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of time share a primary residence and a life together as a couple.”4 Whether a couple has shared a life together will be determined
in light of a number of factors including the parties’ “oral or written
statements,” 5 the extent to which their finances were intermingled, 6
“[t]he extent to which their relationship fostered . . . [either] interdependence” or one party’s dependence on the other, 7 the extent to
which the members of the couple acted or assumed roles in furtherance of their life together,8 the “extent to which the relationship
wrought change in the life” of either party, 9 the emotional or physical intimacy of the relationship,10 and the reputation of the couple in
the community.11 While couples “not related by blood or adoption”
will be presumed to be domestic partners if they have maintained a
common household for a sufficiently long and continuous period of
time,12 couples who are “related by blood or adoption” will not enjoy that presumption, but nonetheless can qualify as domestic part-

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03(1).
Id. § 6.03(7)(a).
See id. § 6.03(7)(b).
Id. § 6.03(7)(c).
See id. § 6.03(7)(d).
See id. § 6.03(7)(e).
See id. § 6.03(7)(h).
See id. § 6.03(7)(i).
Id. § 6.03 cmt. d.

1137

11STR.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/5/01 2:27 AM

[2001

ners.13
The ALI recommendation requires that the individuals live together, and a couple that might otherwise be treated as domestic
partners will not be so treated if the couple does not share a primary
residence.14 This reflects a requirement that states sometimes impose.
For example, in Taylor v. Fields,15 a California appellate court refused
to enforce a promise of “lifetime financial care,”16 at least in part, because Taylor did not make a “showing of a stable and significant relationship evolving out of cohabitation,”17 notwithstanding her having had a forty-two year relationship with Fields.18 Because the
couple had never lived together19 but at most had occasionally spent
weekends together as husband and wife,20 the court held that a necessary prerequisite to recovery for nonmarital partners was lacking.21
Even if the individuals share a residence, the ALI requirement
that individuals share a residence for a significant period of time will
not afford individuals a claim when they have only spent a week or a
month together.22 However, the ALI specifically eschews a brightline rule to determine what constitutes a “significant period of time”
for purposes of establishing whether a domestic partnership exists,23
suggesting instead that “the greater the change wrought by the relationship on the life of either or both parties, and the greater the
losses associated with dissolution of the relationship, the shorter the

13. Id. § 6.03 cmt. d (“[W]hen parties are related by blood or adoption . . . the claimant bears the burden of satisfying the proof of requirements of Paragraph (6).”).
14. See id. § 6.03 cmt. c, illus. 1.
15. 224 Cal. Rptr. 186 (Ct. App. 1986).
16. Id. at 192.
17. Id. at 189. The court also refused to enforce the agreement because it held that the
contract was based on illicit meretricious consideration. See id. at 193 (“Leaving aside the lack
of a claim of cohabitation for the purposes of discussing this point, here, as in Jones, Taylor’s
rendering of sexual services for Leo is inseparable from the rest of the contract. . . . [That] service forms an inseparable part of the consideration for the agreement and renders it unenforceable in its entirety.”).
18. See id. at 188.
19. See id. at 189, 192.
20. See id. at 192.
21. See id.
22. The ALI implies that three years would be a reasonable period for a couple without
children. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. d.
23. Id. § 6.03 cmt. e (“‘[A] significant period of time’ should not be set by a uniform
rule.”).
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period of time necessary to satisfy the requirement.”24
States adopting the ALI recommendation that no bright line be
established would thereby afford the courts some flexibility with respect to whether a domestic partnership existed in a particular case.
As an added benefit, state adoption of the recommendation might
dissuade potential defendants from engaging in “strategic behavior,”25 such as forcing a partner to leave the home a week before the
relationship would have qualified as a domestic partnership.
Of course, according courts this flexibility may result in courts
occasionally wrongly determining that certain individuals are or are
not domestic partners. Further, there is the systemic cost that is imposed when courts are required to hear and weigh evidence to determine whether particular individuals are domestic partners rather
than, for example, ascertain whether they have met criteria that
might be applied mechanically. The gains in fairness by affording the
courts this discretion, however, would presumably more than outweigh these added costs.26
B. Domestic Partnerships Versus Marriages
Chapter 6 of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution
discusses the “legal obligations that domestic partners have toward
one another at the dissolution of their relationship.”27 Individuals
who have been domestic partners for a significant period of time may
be subject to claims for support or property division when their relationship ends.28 However, the ALI takes great care to distinguish between the rights and responsibilities of marital partners and the
rights and responsibilities of domestic partners. “Marriage creates a
legal status that encompasses not only inter se rights and responsibilities of the spouses, but also rights and responsibilities of the spouses
in relation to third parties and the state.”29 In contrast, while
“American law has recognized inter se claims of domestic partners, it
has generally declined to establish rights with respect to third parties

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
See infra Part III (discussing fairness concerns).
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01 cmt. a.
See id. § 6.03 cmt. b.
Id. § 6.01 cmt. a.
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and the state.”30
The ALI proposal is thus modeled on current state law. Rather
than suggest, for example, that the state afford certain benefits to
domestic partners, the recommendation involves a modification and
clarification of the conditions under which domestic partners will
have acquired financial obligations with respect to one another and
of the contents of those obligations once acquired.
The ALI recommendation does not equate domestic partnership
with marriage. On the contrary, it emphasizes important differences
between these two types of relationships. For example, a state recognizing this new domestic partnership status does not thereby recognize a new form of marriage and would not be forced to extend
benefits to a new set of beneficiaries. Indeed, rather than create an
additional drain on limited state resources, this recommendation, if
adopted, would help to relieve the state of some of the financial obligations that it might otherwise be forced to bear. The recommendation would protect “society from social welfare burdens that
should be borne, in whole or in part, by individuals”31 since it requires the distribution of assets acquired during the relationship
rather than permitting the shrewd party to keep the assets and forcing the less sophisticated party to seek public assistance.
Consider two unmarried individuals, Lee and Pat, who have lived
together for decades. Lee works outside the home, and Pat works inside the home. All the property that has been acquired during the relationship is in Lee’s name, notwithstanding that Lee has been able
to devote time and energy to the acquisition of these assets precisely
because Pat has been doing so much work within the home. Were
these individuals to separate, Pat might be left without any property
or means of support and might have to receive public assistance.
However, were they to separate after the jurisdiction in which they
lived had adopted the ALI domestic partnership recommendation,
Pat would receive some of the property acquired during the relationship and, in addition, might be entitled to support.
The ALI makes clear that states adopting its recommendation
would not thereby “revive the doctrine of common-law marriage.”32
Common law marriage not only affects the rights and responsibilities

30. Id.
31. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02(2).
32. Id. § 6.01 cmt. a.
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of the partners with respect to each other but also affects the rights
and responsibilities of third parties with respect to the couple,33
whereas the proposed change would only affect the rights and responsibilities of the parties themselves.34 Thus, according to the ALI
domestic partnership proposal, a state or employer would not be required to extend to a domestic partner the benefits that would be
due to a spouse. Had the ALI instead recommended a reinstitution
of common law marriage,35 perhaps coupled with a recommendation
of a change in the name of such unions to “domestic partnerships,”
the states and employers would potentially have been subject to a variety of new financial responsibilities.36
States have had no difficulty distinguishing between marriages
and long-term nonmarital relationships. Consider Williams v. Corbett,37 a case in which the Georgia Supreme Court held that a
woman in a meretricious38 relationship was not entitled to workers’
compensation benefits as a dependent of a worker who had died on
the job.39 Had the woman had a common law marriage instead of
having merely cohabited with the deceased,40 she might have been
able to receive those benefits.41 Consider also Jones v. D. Canale &
33. See id. § 6.01 cmt. a (“Where recognized, common-law marriage is fully equivalent
to ceremonial, or formal marriage. In terms of legal incidents, there is no distinction between a
lawful common-law marriage and a lawful ceremonial marriage.”).
34. Indeed, the rights of third parties such as innocent spouses whose marital partners
have established domestic partnerships with others would also not be affected by these provisions. See id. § 6.01 cmt. c (“The rule . . . defers fully to the claims of a spouse, but allows
claims of a domestic partner to the extent that they would not displace those of a spouse.”).
35. Common law marriages are often thought to be fraught with difficulties including
proving their existence. They have been described as “a fruitful source of perjury and fraud.”
Estate of Gavula (Appeal of Ardos), 417 A.2d 168, 171 (Pa. 1980).
36. See Harry G. Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agreements: Unruly
Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 163, 196 (1985) (“The purpose in repealing common-law marriage statutes was to deny couples selecting informal, non-ceremonial arrangements the status benefits of marriage.”).
37. 398 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 1990).
38. Formerly, in many states, meretricious relationships (i.e., sexual relationships which
were nonmarital) had a pejorative connotation. See, e.g., Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 21
(Mich. 1999) (distinguishing between “conventional marriages” on the one hand and “‘illicit’
or ‘meretricious’ relationships” on the other hand) (quoting Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d
1204, 1207 (Ill. 1979)). Some states now no longer use the term pejoratively. See infra notes
60, 62–63 and accompanying text.
39. See Williams, 398 S.E.2d at 2.
40. See id. (affirming that “one cannot recover dependency benefits arising from a living
arrangement that includes neither ceremonial nor common-law marriage.”).
41. See id. See also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Smith, 259 S.E.2d 675 (Ga. Ct. App.
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Co.,42 in which the Tennessee Supreme Court had to determine
whether the plaintiff was entitled to workers’ compensation death
benefits after the death of her partner of twenty-five years.43 The
court held that she was not entitled to those benefits because both
she and her partner had known that they were not legally married.44
Had she validly contracted a common law marriage with him in another state45 or even had she believed falsely, but in good faith, that
she was married to the decedent and thus been a putative spouse, she
might have qualified for benefits.46
A separate issue is whether a widowed person who has a meretricious relationship would stop receiving the workers’ compensation
benefits which had been awarded after the former spouse’s death.
That might depend upon the construction of the existing statute.47
For example, the Delaware statute extinguishes survivor benefits only
upon the death or remarriage of the surviving spouse.48 In Wilmington Finishing Co. v. Leary,49 a Delaware court refused to read the remarriage provision as including those who were in a meretricious relationship precisely because that would treat the latter relationship as
if it were a common law marriage, which Delaware refuses to recognize.50
1979) (remanding workers’ compensation benefits case to determine whether claimant was
common law wife of deceased).
42. 652 S.W.2d 336 (Tenn. 1983).
43. See id. at 336.
44. See id. at 338. See also Lavoie v. Int’l Paper Co., 403 A.2d 1186, 1191 (Me. 1979)
(“We find nothing in the Act as it now exists . . . which would indicate that the Legislature
intended to enlarge the meaning of the word ‘family’ under the Workers’ Compensation Act
to include a woman with whom a deceased employee was living in a union not solemnized by
formal marriage.”).
45. See Shelby County v. Williams, 510 S.W.2d 73, 73–74 (Tenn. 1974) (“Though
Tennessee does not recognize as valid a common law marriage contracted within this state, our
courts do recognize as valid a common law marriage contracted in a state where such a marriage is valid.”) (quoting Troxel v. Jones, 322 S.W.2d 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1958)) (citations
omitted).
46. See D. Canale & Co., 652 S.W.2d at 338 (discussing case in which benefits were
granted when claimant believed falsely but in good faith that she was married to the decedent).
47. See, e.g., Todd v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 692 A.2d 1086 (Pa. 1997) (construing statute to permit widow to receive benefits).
48. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2330(g) (1995) (“Should any dependent of a deceased employee die, or should the surviving spouse remarry, the right of such dependent or
such surviving spouse to compensation under this section shall cease.”); Wilmington Finishing
Co. v. Leary, No. 99A-06-001 JEB, 2000 WL 303320, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2000).
49. 2000 WL 303320.
50. See id. at *3.
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The ALI proposal that public benefits not be awarded to domestic partnerships follows the example set by several,51 but not all,52
states. For example, in Peffley-Warner v. Bowen,53 the Washington
Supreme Court held that a woman who had been in a meretricious
relationship for twenty-two years54 did not qualify as a wife under the
laws of intestate succession, which meant that she could not receive
widow’s benefits under the Social Security Act.55 That court reached
a similar result in Davis v. Employment Security Department,56 in
which a woman who had quit her job to live with her domestic partner in another place was denied unemployment benefits because she
was held to have voluntarily left her job without good cause.57 Had
she instead “voluntarily [left] her job in order to marry and move to
a place where it would be impracticable to commute to her old
job,”58 she would have had good cause for stopping work.59 The
court explained that “while the definition of the term ‘meretricious’
has lost its original derogatory connotation in recent court decisions,
the term ‘marital’ is still defined as ‘of or relating to marriage or the
marriage state.’”60 Precisely because marriage and domestic partnerships are not equivalent, the court refused to hold that the plaintiff’s
quitting for the sake of a domestic partnership qualified as leaving for
good cause.61
51. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Jewel, 164 S.E.2d 846, 847 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968) (“In
cases where there was a meretricious relationship as knowingly living in adultery, most of the
courts have denied compensation, basing this denial on grounds of public policy.”) (citations
omitted). In this case, the court denied worker’s compensation benefits to a woman who had
been involved in a meretricious (and, in fact, adulterous) relationship with the deceased employee. See id. at 847–48.
52. See West v. Barton-Malow Co., 230 N.W.2d 545 (Mich. 1975) (permitting woman
in meretricious relationship to receive workers’ compensation death benefits); Dep’t of Indus.
Relations v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 156 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Ct. App. 1979) (permitting
woman in meretricious relationship with the deceased to receive workers’ compensation death
benefits); Parkinson v. J. & S. Tool Co., 313 A.2d 609 (N.J. 1974) (permitting woman living
with but no longer civilly married to decedent to receive workers’ compensation death benefits).
53. 778 P.2d 1022 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).
54. See id. at 1023.
55. See id. at 1023, 1027.
56. 737 P.2d 1262 (Wash. 1987) (en banc).
57. See id. at 1264.
58. Id. at 1266 (emphasis added).
59. See id.
60. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY).
61. See id.

1143

11STR.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/5/01 2:27 AM

[2001

The Davis court’s analysis is important to consider for at least
two reasons. It makes clear both that “meretricious,” at least when
applied to relationships,62 no longer carries the negative association
that it once had63 and that courts have no difficulty distinguishing
between marital and nonmarital relationships.
The California Supreme Court has also made clear that it can
easily distinguish between marital and nonmarital relationships. In
Norman v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,64 the court denied unemployment compensation benefits to someone who had
quit her job to join her fiancé in the state of Washington.65 The
court pointed out that the claimant had not “represent[ed] that her
marriage was imminent, that her presence in Washington was required to prepare for the wedding, or, indeed, that she had any definite or fixed marital plans.”66 The court explained that California law
does not “equate a nonmarital relationship with marriage”67 and
suggested that the “[l]egislature’s decision to give weight to marital
relationships in the determination of ‘good cause’ supports public
policy encouraging marriage . . . .”68
It might seem surprising that the court would deny unemployment benefits to a fiancé in the name of promoting marriage. The
decision is more understandable in light of the court’s skepticism
that the plaintiff would actually marry her partner. Noting that the
plaintiff had not married during the two years that the case had
62. But see infra notes 175–80 and accompanying text, (describing instead meretricious
sexual services).
63. For other courts suggesting that the pejorative connotation of “meretricious” does
not reflect what is involved in many long-term nonmarital relationships, see West v. BartonMalow Co., 230 N.W.2d 545, 546 (Mich. 1975) (“If we read meretricious as the dictionary
defines it—the relationship of a prostitute or a woman given to indiscriminate lewdness—we
find no support whatsoever in the record for describing the relationship that existed between
deceased and plaintiff as one based on meretricious cohabitation.”); and Kozlowski v.
Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 909 (N.J. 1979) (Pashman, J., concurring) (“In recent years, cohabitation between unmarried adults has become an increasingly prevalent phenomenon. To
label such conduct as ‘meretricious’—that is, as akin to prostitution—would ignore the realities
of today’s society.”).
64. 663 P.2d 904 (Cal. 1983) (en banc). But see MacGregor v. Unemployment Ins.
Appeals Bd., 689 P.2d 453 (Cal. 1983) (holding that the lack of a legally recognized marriage
did not prevent plaintiff from showing good cause for leaving employment because plaintiff
had established a family unit consisting of herself, her fiancé, and their child).
65. See Norman, 663 P.2d at 905.
66. Id. at 906.
67. Id. at 907.
68. Id. at 908.

1144

11STR.DOC

12/5/01 2:27 AM

1135]

A Small Step Forward

wound its way through the courts,69 the court at least implicitly
treated the case as if it had involved nonmarital cohabitants.
States should not refuse an individual unemployment compensation because that individual quits a job to join a domestic partner.
Indeed, permitting receipt of benefits in such a case promotes many
of the same societal interests that would be promoted in a case in
which an individual quits a job to join a marital spouse. Nonetheless,
the fact that states may deny such compensation in those circumstances illustrates that courts neither confuse nor conflate marital and
domestic partnership status. Thus, adoption of the ALI recommendation should not be avoided for fear that such confusion or conflation would occur.
III. THE PROMOTION OF FAIRNESS
The overriding justification for the ALI proposal is to promote
fairness. In many cases, the less sophisticated or more trusting partner suffers when a nonmarital relationship ends and the assets acquired during that relationship are distributed. Adoption of the ALI
recommendation would promote a much fairer distribution of assets
in many of the kinds of cases under examination here.
A. What Is Fair?
The primary objective of the ALI recommendation is the “fair
distribution of the economic gains and losses incident to termination
of the relationship of domestic partners.”70 Ascertaining which distribution would be fair is the difficult task. Even where the parties
have expressly agreed to a particular distribution, worries about coercion and deception may arise. However, most couples do not expressly state how their assets should be distributed should their relationship end, and the failure to do so makes it all the more difficult
for courts to effect a fair distribution of the assets acquired during
the relationship.
All else equal, fairness dictates distributing the assets acquired
during the relationship in accordance with the express agreement of
the parties, and, in fact, the ALI recommendation suggests that an

69. See id. at 909 (“It may be of some interest that, indeed, at oral argument more than
2 years later, we were informed that no marriage had as yet occurred.”).
70. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02.
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express agreement with respect to the distribution of assets should be
enforced,71 absent unconscionability, fraud, etc.72 However, this
method of resolution would cover only a small percentage of the
cases since few couples “make explicit contracts to govern their relationship or its termination,”73 notwithstanding the “rapidly increasing percentage of Americans [who] form domestic relationships”74
without observing the formalities of marriage.
B. Default Rules
Where no explicit agreement has been made, there must be some
default rule regarding how the property is to be allocated should the
relationship come to an end, even if the recommended distribution
involves leaving the property with the person who currently possesses
or has title to it.75 Traditionally, where no express agreement was
made, whoever had title to the property at issue could keep it.76 The
advantages of this rule, which might be called the “title theory,” include clarity and predictability. Absent an explicit agreement to the
contrary, the person with title would own the property in question,
and courts would not be faced with difficult decisions regarding the

71. The recommendation explains:
A contract between domestic partners that (i) waives or limits claims that would
otherwise arise under this Chapter or (ii) provides remedies not provided by this
Chapter, is enforceable according to its terms and displaces any inconsistent claims
under this Chapter, so long as it satisfies the requirements of Chapter 7 for the enforcement of agreements.
See id. § 6.01(2).
72. See id. ch. 7 for a discussion of the conditions under which contracts should not be
enforced.
73. Id. § 6.02 cmt. a.
74. Id. § 6.02 cmt. a.
75. See Beal v. Beal, where the court stated:
Historically, courts have been reluctant to grant relief of any kind to a party who was
involved in what was termed a “meretricious” relationship. Courts took the position
that the parties had entered into a relationship outside the bounds of law, and the
courts would not allow themselves to be used to solve the property disputes evolving from that relationship. Generally, the parties were left as they were when they
came to court, with ownership resting in whoever happened to have title or possession at the time. The rationale was predicated on public policy or even an invocation
of the clean hands doctrine.
577 P.2d 507, 508 (Or. 1978) (en banc).
76. See Shuraleff v. Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764, 768 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (“Awarding
property to the one with title had been the rule in cases where courts refused to act in nonmarital relationships.”).
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appropriate distribution of assets when the intents of the parties
could not be clearly ascertained.
While the title theory has advantages, it has serious disadvantages as well. For example, the title theory is likely to lead to inequitable results and to put at risk exactly those individuals who are least
likely to be equipped to adequately assess that risk. An Oregon appellate court explained that employing such a rule often results in
unfairness, since it gives an “advantage to the party who was more
cunning or shrewd.”77 Looking beyond who has title to the contested property “prevent[s] the party with title, or [the party] in possession of property, from enjoying ownership without consideration
of the contribution of the other party.”78
Consider, for example, Sharp v. Kosmalski 79 in which a fifty-sixyear-old widower, Sharp, “whose education did not go beyond the
eighth grade, developed a very close relationship with” a school
teacher, Ms. Kosmalski.80 He bestowed gifts on her and eventually
proposed to her. Kosmalski refused Sharp’s offer of marriage, but
continued to accept gifts from him and, with his permission, withdrew substantial sums of money from his bank account.81 Eventually,
Sharp conveyed his interest in his farm to her.82 Not long after,83
Kosmalski ordered Sharp to leave the home, at which point he had
assets of only $300.84 The New York Court of Appeals remanded the
case for a determination of whether the defendant had been unjustly
enriched.85 The court warned that the “case seem[ed] to present the
classic example of a situation where equity should intervene to scrutinize a transaction pregnant with opportunity for abuse and unfairness.”86 Had the court merely looked at the express agreement of the
parties, it likely would have held that Kosmalski must be allowed to
retain the property, Sharp’s lack of sophistication notwithstanding. 87
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 351 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 1976).
80. See id. at 722.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. Sharp conveyed his interest to Kosmalski in September 1971, and Kosmalski ordered
Sharp out of the home in February 1973. See id. at 723.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 724.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 723. To make matters worse, Sharp had only recently been widowed (the
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C. Hewitt v. Hewitt
In Hewitt v. Hewitt,88 the Illinois Supreme Court had to decide
whether to distribute property in a case involving two nonmarital
cohabitants who had separated.89 Hewitt is important both because it
has been discussed in numerous cases90 and because the weaknesses
of the opinion suggest some of the weaknesses in arguments against
adoption of the ALI proposal.
In Hewitt, the plaintiff alleged that she and the defendant had
lived together “in an unmarried, family-like relationship to which
three children [had] been born”91 and that he had promised “he
would ‘share his life, his future, his earnings and his property’ with
her.”92 The intermediate appellate court found that there had been
an express oral contract on which plaintiff could base her cause of action.93 The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, fearing that recognizing
her cause of action would mean that “unmarried cohabitants [could]
acquire property rights merely by cohabitation and subsequent separation,”94 notwithstanding plaintiff’s claim that those cases were distinguishable because her claim was based on an express contract.95
The Illinois high court rejected the approach in which only express contracts would be enforced, apparently agreeing with the intermediate appellate court and the California Supreme Court96 that
“if common law principles of express contract govern express agreements between unmarried cohabitants, common law principles of
implied contract, equitable relief and constructive trust must govern
the parties’ relations in the absence of such an agreement.”97 Yet, the
court failed to note that (1) a jurisdiction might choose to enforce

case does not indicate how long after the death the conveyance occurred), see id. at 722, and,
thus, was likely even more vulnerable than he might have been.
88. 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).
89. See id. at 1205.
90. See, e.g., Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15 (Mich. 1999); Goode v. Goode, 396
S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990); County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714 (Wis. 1993).
91. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1205.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 1206.
94. Id. at 1207–11.
95. See id.
96. The Hewitt court was referring to the California Supreme Court’s decision in
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
97. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1207.
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only express contracts,98 and (2) even if a jurisdiction recognized implied contracts and a variety of equitable remedies, the parties would
not be acquiring property rights simply by virtue of living together
but instead because of implicit understandings or society’s need to
promote justice and fairness.
The Hewitt court feared that by upholding the lower court decision it would somehow “rehabilitate the doctrine of common law
marriage,”99 notwithstanding its recognition that affirming the lower
court decision would not entitle the plaintiff, Victoria, to have all the
benefits that a common law spouse would have had.100 Despite language in the opinion to the contrary, the court would likely have reversed the intermediate appellate decision even if it had been persuaded that an affirmance would not have rehabilitated common law
marriage. The court believed that “[o]f substantially greater importance than the rights of the immediate parties [was] the impact of
such recognition upon our society and the institution of marriage,”101 which is why the court’s recognition that the plaintiff’s
claims had merit was ultimately unavailing.102
Ironically, it is doubtful that permitting recovery would have had
a significant impact upon society or the institution of marriage,103
and “cohabitation has flourished [in Illinois] despite judicial unwillingness to recognize contracts between cohabitants.”104 Given that a
Hewitt affirmance would likely have had little or no adverse impact
on society, the decision was especially unfortunate since, as an Illi-

98. The Minnesota statute states, in pertinent part:
If sexual relations between the parties are contemplated, a contract between a man
and a woman who are living together in this state out of wedlock, or who are about
to commence living together in this state out of wedlock, is enforceable as to terms
concerning the property and financial relations of the parties only if:
(1) the contract is written and signed by the parties, and
(2) enforcement is sought after termination of the relationship.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.075 (West 2000).
99. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 1207.
102. See id. at 1211 (“We do not intend to suggest that plaintiff’s claims are totally devoid of merit.”).
103. See Jan Skelton, Hewitt to Ayala: A Wrong Turn for Cohabitants’ Rights, 82 ILL. B.J.
364, 366 (1994) (“[I]t is unlikely that refusing to recognize the contracts of cohabitants actually encourages marriages or discourages cohabitation.”).
104. Id. (citing Gary Lloyd Smith, Hewitt v. Hewitt: Non-Marital Cohabitation and the
Doctrine of Immorality, 69 ILL. B.J. 368, 371 (1981)).
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nois appellate court has subsequently suggested, “[t]he result in
Hewitt was particularly harsh in light of its facts.”105
Bracketing whether Hewitt was rightly decided, some of the
bases upon which that decision rested have either since disappeared
or have been accounted for in more nuanced ways by other states.106
For example, the Hewitt court emphasized that the Illinois legislature had refused to adopt no-fault divorce.107 However, since the decision, Illinois has adopted no-fault divorce and has decriminalized
cohabitation,108 thus undermining the claim that Illinois public policy differs substantially from that of other states in these respects.109
The Hewitt court noted that under Illinois statutory law, a putative spouse has the rights of a legal spouse “if he goes through a
marriage ceremony and cohabits with another in the good-faith belief that he is validly married.”110 Once he or she learns of the invalidity of the marriage, the status of putative spouse terminates. The
court concluded that this statutory language indicates an “unmistakeable [sic] legislative judgment disfavoring the grant of mutual
property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.”111 Yet, at least
as plausible a way to interpret the Illinois legislature’s intent would
have been to say that the legislature granted the putative spouse the
“rights of a legal spouse”112 precisely because that person would have
had a reasonable and justified expectation of those benefits until he
or she had learned of the invalidity of the marriage.
If this is the correct interpretation, however, then there are important implications for the treatment of the nonmarital cohabitant.
While the nonmarital cohabitant might not have a justified and reasonable expectation with respect to benefits provided by third parties, he or she probably would have such an expectation with respect
to those benefits expressly or impliedly promised by his or her partner, and, thus, a promise to confer such benefits should be enforce-

105. Medley v. Strong, 588 N.E.2d 244, 246 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990).
106. See infra notes 116–19 and accompanying text (discussing Tennessee’s treatment of
nonmarital cohabitants).
107. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
108. See Skelton, supra note 103, at 366 (noting the Illinois Legislature’s adoption of nofault divorce and decriminalization of cohabitation).
109. See id. (noting the change in Illinois public policy).
110. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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able. The legislative intent to promote fairness and to prevent the
disappointment of reasonable and justified expectations would be
served by allowing the nonmarital cohabitant to receive those benefits.
The interpretation of the Illinois legislature’s intent offered
above—that promises between nonmarital partners are enforceable
but that third-party obligations are not thereby created—reflects the
manner in which some states have handled the difference between
spouses and nonmarital cohabitants. The former is entitled to thirdparty benefits and the latter is only entitled to inter se benefits.113 For
example, while refusing to recognize an obligation to extend benefits
to nonmarital cohabitants,114 the Tennessee Supreme Court has
manifested a more generous attitude with respect to nonmarital
partners’ inter se obligations and benefits. In Martin v. Coleman,115
the court was willing to divide up a business between two unmarried
cohabitants, notwithstanding that the two had “a meretricious relationship,”116 and one stayed at home while the other provided for
the financial needs of the couple.117
Three factors suggest that Hewitt should no longer be followed:
(1) the existence of a different and plausible explanation of legislative
intent that would have supported a different result; (2) legislative actions subsequent to Hewitt that undermined the basis upon which
that decision was made; and (3) the potential for very harsh and unfair results if Hewitt is neither overruled118 nor confined to its facts.
Regrettably, Illinois courts have nonetheless continued to reward the
nonmarital cohabitant who is shrewd enough to keep the property in

113. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (discussing the Tennessee Supreme
Court’s treatment of D. Canale & Co.).
114. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the fact
that the parties knew that they were not married).
115. 19 S.W.3d 757 (Tenn. 2000).
116. Martin, 19 S.W.3d at 761 (Tenn. 2000); see also Bass v. Bass, 814 S.W.2d 38
(Tenn. 1991) (inferring existence of a partnership from the circumstances and allowing distribution of assets to a domestic partner).
117. See Martin, 19 S.W.3d at 759 (“Delores Coleman did not work outside the home.
Robert Coleman, an engineer, was the family’s sole provider.”).
118. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court might take the opportunity to overrule the Hewitt
decision in light of subsequent legislative actions and cases that have undermined the decision.
Cf. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“[W]e have overruled our precedents when subsequent cases have undermined their doctrinal underpinnings . . . .”) (citing
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).
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his own name.119
In Ayala v. Fox,120 Lawrence Fox proposed to the plaintiff “that
they jointly pay for the construction of a single-family home,”121
“promis[ing] plaintiff that title to the property would be transferred
to their names as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and that
plaintiff Ayala would receive one-half of the equity of the house in
the event that they stopped residing together.”122 However, “Fox
failed to transfer the title into joint tenancy and failed to pay plaintiff
her half of the equity in the property.”123 Notwithstanding the clear
agreement and plaintiff’s actions supporting the existence of that
agreement,124 the court denied recovery, suggesting that plaintiff was
“seeking recovery based on rights closely resembling those arising
from a conventional marriage, namely, an equitable interest in the
‘marital’ residence.”125 The court feared that if it were to uphold the
plaintiff’s rights, it “would, in effect, be granting to an unmarried
cohabitant substantially the same marital rights as those which married persons enjoy.”126
The Ayala court’s reasoning is unpersuasive. Merely because the
plaintiff was seeking an equitable remedy to enforce a promise to
share title in property does not somehow imply that the plaintiff was
seeking to have the parties treated as if they had married. Had they
shared living quarters but not had a sexual relationship, the court
presumably would have enforced the agreement, notwithstanding
that it would thereby have given an equitable interest in the common
residence. The Ayala decision rewarded deception and unfair dealing
and can hardly be thought to have implemented good public policy.

119. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201, 205–06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (discussing Hewitt with approval when denying claim of same-sex partner to survivor benefits).
120. 564 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
121. Id. at 920.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. As stated by the court:
In reliance on Fox’s promises, plaintiff obligated herself to pay a $48,000 mortgage,
which was recorded on May 16, 1978. . . . From September 1978 to October 1988,
plaintiff and Fox lived in the house and jointly contributed to the mortgage payments. From 1978 to 1981, Fox was unemployed, and, consequently, plaintiff paid
the majority of the mortgage payments, taxes, and insurance during that period.
Id.
125. Id. at 922.
126. Id.

1152

11STR.DOC

1135]

12/5/01 2:27 AM

A Small Step Forward
IV. THE CONTRACT PARADIGM

Some states have distributed the assets acquired during a nonmarital relationship in light of contract principles. While this is preferable to the policy suggested by the Hewitt court, this approach
nonetheless has drawbacks which the ALI proposal avoids, since the
difficulties in establishing the parties’ intentions may militate in favor
of modifying the presumptions usually employed in the contract
paradigm.127
A. The Express or Implied Contract Model of Relationships
States use a variety of doctrines to avoid unfair results when
nonmarital relationships end. Some states make use of contract principles to govern allocation of the partnership resources, whether the
agreements have been express or merely implied.128 Others make use
of equitable doctrines like unjust enrichment to assure a fair allocation of goods acquired during the relationship.129
In Shuraleff v. Donnelly,130 an Oregon case, the parties separated
after having lived together for fourteen years.131 The court had to
decide how the parties’ property should be divided, which depended
on the appropriate characterization of the parties’ relationship.132
The parties owned farmland on which they had planted holly for
eventual sale. The plaintiff, Shuraleff, argued that she and her partner
127. For reasons that the contract paradigm is inappropriate because it mischaracterizes
the relationship at issue, see infra notes 197–211 and accompanying text.
128. See Wilcox v. Trautz, where the court stated:
These financial and property arrangements stem from a relationship that involves
sexual cohabitation, but, in creating them, the parties are principally motivated by an
intention to hold, or dispose of, property in a mutually acceptable way in order to
manage day-to-day matters and to avoid litigation when the relationship ends. Such
financial planning is enforceable according to the usual rules of contract.
693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998).
129. See Suggs v. Norris, where the court stated:
We now make clear and adopt the rule that agreements regarding the finances and
property of an unmarried but cohabiting couple, whether express or implied, are enforceable as long as sexual services or promises thereof do not provide the consideration for such agreements. Moreover, where appropriate, the equitable remedies of
constructive and resulting trusts should be available as should recovery under a
quasi-contractual theory on quantum meruit.
364 S.E.2d 159, 162 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
130. 817 P.2d 764 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
131. See id. at 765.
132. See id.
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had merely had a “‘business’ relationship”133 and that “the only
property subject to distribution [was] the real property held in joint
names.”134 Notwithstanding that each had business skills that had
been contributed to the business (she in investment and management and he in building and maintenance135), the court rejected the
contention that the couple had had a pure business relationship.136
After noting that some of the properties acquired during the relationship “were in the names of the parties as ‘husband and wife,’”137
that the defendant, Donnelly, was listed as a beneficiary of Shuraleff’s
Public Employees Retirement System account,138 and that “neither
party had assigned a value to the other’s labor”139 in their business,
the court concluded that their relationship had been a “domestic
one”140 and held that an equitable result could only be achieved “by
including assets held in each party’s name alone.”141
In Shuraleff, the plaintiff had put some of the assets in her own
name and had instructed their accountant not to discuss these matters with Donnelly.142 The plaintiff thereby indicated her intent not
to have these assets jointly owned.143 Although the court accepted
that plaintiff did not intend that these assets be jointly held, it noted
that “a mechanistic application . . . regarding ‘intent’ would reward

133. Id. at 766.
134. Id.
135. The court explained why it refused to accept that the couple had only had a business
relationship:
Despite plaintiff’s attempt to characterize the relationship here as only a “business”
one, it was a domestic one. The parties had an intimate relationship and lived together for 14 years. Although plaintiff claimed that she and defendant strictly accounted each month for individual expenses, the evidence shows that, over the
years, accounts were often muddled with both parties making trade-offs. Furthermore, in this so-called “business” relationship, neither party assigned a value to the
other’s labor. Plaintiff’s strengths were primarily in investment and management.
Defendant used his physical skills and knowledge of construction to construct the
homes and the bridge and to improve the properties.
Id. at 767.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 765.
138. See id. at 766 n.2. She was “a teacher and consultant in the Eugene public school
system.” Id. at 765.
139. Id. at 767.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 768.
142. See id.
143. See id.
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plaintiff, despite her failure to make it clear to defendant, in the face
of his belief in their common goal, that she was subtracting her investments from that endeavor.” 144 Rather than refuse to include the
separate property in the distribution because the parties did not have
a common intent with respect to which properties would be jointly
owned, the Shuraleff court instead promoted equity by including the
separate property within the distribution. Here, fairness required going beyond the terms of the parties’ agreement, and use of a formal
contract model would have produced inequitable results.145
Frequently, when nonmarital partners break up, the partners do
not share the same understanding of what they had agreed to do,
and the less sophisticated or the more trusting partner ends up with a
much smaller share of the collective property than that party thought
was his or her due. Certainly, it will be difficult to determine which,
if either, of the parties correctly remembers the agreement if nothing
was written down—the oral agreement may have been made long
ago or may have been amended when the circumstances changed
during the course of the relationship.146 Matters may be even less
clear if the agreement is implied from the circumstances. Thus, there
may be a variety of circumstances in which the content or, perhaps,
even the existence of the contract cannot be established.
Even if the plaintiff cannot establish that an oral contract existed
or, perhaps, all of the terms of that contract, a separate question is
how, if at all, the assets should be distributed when the relationship
ends. As an Indiana appellate court suggested, failure to distribute
the assets might “do more to discredit the legal system in the eyes of
those who learn of the facts of the case than to strengthen the institution of marriage or the moral fiber of our society.”147
144. Id.
145. Had Donnelly in fact understood and agreed to this distribution of property recommended by Shuraleff, the ALI proposal would have permitted the inequitable distribution.
See supra note 71 (discussing contracts between nonmarital partners).
146. Compare Kozlowksi v. Kozlowski, where the court reasoned:
Whether we designate the agreement reached by the parties in 1968 to be express,
as we do here, or implied is of no legal consequence. The only difference is in the
nature of the proof of the agreement. Parties entering this type of relationship usually do not record their understanding in specific legalese. Rather, as here, the terms
of their agreement are to be found in their respective versions of the agreement, and
their acts and conduct in the light of the subject matter and the surrounding circumstances.
403 A.2d 902, 906 (N.J. 1979).
147. Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1330 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
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Given the possible difficulties involved in ascertaining the intents
of the parties, states might adopt any one of a number of ways of
handling the distribution of assets when a nonmarital relationship
ends. They might: (1) refuse to effect a distribution even if the parties had made an express agreement to do so,148 (2) require that the
agreement be in writing,149 (3) enforce express but not implied contracts,150 (4) enforce express and implied contracts but eschew equitable remedies like constructive trust or quantum meruit,151 (5) enforce express and implied contracts and employ other equitable
remedies,152 or (6) “distribute cohabitants’ property as they do in divorce cases.”153 Arguably, the difficulty in ascertaining intent militates in favor of shifting the ownership presumptions, precisely because there is such potential for confusion and unfairness. It simply
cannot be thought good public policy to reward individuals for failing to fulfill their promises or for misrepresenting to their partners
how the assets are characterized.154 As the Arizona Supreme Court
explained, “The rule of non-enforcement . . . favors the strongest,
the most unscrupulous, the one better prepared to take advantage or

148. See supra notes 91–101 and accompanying text (discussing the Hewitt approach).
149. See supra note 98 (Minnesota statute requiring that agreement be in writing).
150. See Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 753 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (“[W]e are
unwilling to extend equitable principles to the extent plaintiff would have us do so, since recovery based on principles of contracts implied in law essentially would resurrect the old common-law marriage doctrine which was specifically abolished by the Legislature.”).
151. See Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Mass. 1998) (Massachusetts does “not
recognize common law marriage, do[es] not extend to unmarried couples the rights possessed
by married couples who divorce, and reject[s] equitable remedies that might have the effect of
dividing property between unmarried parties.”).
152. In Watts v. Watts, the court noted:
Courts traditionally have settled contract and property disputes between unmarried
persons, some of whom have cohabited. Nonmarital cohabitation does not render
every agreement between the cohabiting parties illegal and does not automatically
preclude one of the parties from seeking judicial relief, such as statutory or common
law partition, damages for breach of express or implied contract, constructive trust
and quantum meruit where the party alleges, and later proves, facts supporting the
legal theory. The issue for the court in each case is whether the complaining party
has set forth any legally cognizable claim.
405 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Wis. 1987).
153. Sanford N. Katz, Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1267
(1998); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY & THE NEW PROPERTY 281 (1981).
154. But see supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons that the
Hewitt court found convincing as a matter of policy for not enforcing such agreements).
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the more cunning of the cohabitants . . . [which is not] equitable or
good public policy.”155
B. Shifting the Presumptions
The ALI recommendation would handle a number of the cases
discussed here rather well. When there is a meeting of the minds that
the parties do not want the distribution of assets to follow the ALI
recommendation, they can memorialize that intention in writing and
thereby avoid the ALI default rules. Absent an express or implied
agreement, however, the ALI asset distribution method would apply.156 The proposed system “shifts the burden of showing a contract
to the party who wishes to avoid such fairness-based remedies, rather
than putting it on the one who seeks to claim them.”157
The ALI recommendation involves a compromise. Respecting
the intent of the parties is viewed as important. However, given the
difficulty in ascertaining the intent of the parties and the great potential for unfairness absent a shift in presumption, the ALI recommendation is sensible and, arguably, one of the best approaches to a
problem with no easy or straightforward solution.
C. The Effect of Adopting the ALI Compromise
The adoption of the ALI proposal might at first seem likely to
induce some individuals to choose nonmarital cohabitation over
marriage. Yet, on closer examination, the ALI recommendation cannot plausibly be thought to be intended or likely to “encourage parties to enter a nonmarital relationship as an alternative to marriage.”158 Indeed, as the ALI suggests, “to the extent that some
individuals avoid marriage in order to avoid responsibilities to a partner, [the modification] . . . reduces the incentive to avoid marriage
because it diminishes the effectiveness of the strategy.”159 Further,
because “informal domestic relationships are not generally recognized by third parties, including governments, which often make

155. Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664, 670 (Ariz. 1984).
156. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.02 (adoption of the
Principles would put in place a “set of default rules that apply to domestic partners who do not
provide explicitly for a different set of rules.”).
157. Id. § 6.03 cmt. b.
158. Id. § 6.02.
159. Id.
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marriage advantageous under various regulatory and benefit
schemes,”160 the state incentives to marry are still in place. Thus, in a
relationship in which one of the partners has a stronger economic
position than the other, the ALI recommendation makes marriage at
least as attractive as non-marriage for both parties: the economically
weaker party would derive benefits from third parties, for example,
by becoming eligible to receive benefits from the state, and the economically stronger party would have lost some of her ability to protect assets from the other party and thus would no longer have the
same incentives not to marry. Just as would be true were they to
have married, the parties would have to agree to opt out in order for
the presumptions regarding ownership of assets to be changed.161
In Western States Construction, Inc. v. Michoff,162 Justice Springer
argued in dissent that “[p]ermitting community property to be created by cohabitation or contract is a disincentive to marriage; it gives
unmarried persons the rights of community property without imposing upon them the mutual assumption of duties that is attendant to
the marital status.”163 He was objecting to the state’s willingness to
allow nonmarital cohabitants to contract to have their property
treated as community property because unmarried persons would
then “be in a position to choose whether or not they wish to be governed by community property law; whereas, community ownership is
thrust upon married persons at the time of their marriage unless they
agree in writing not to hold property as community.”164 He suggested that by affording nonmarital cohabitants this option, “married
couples will automatically be controlled by community property laws
unless they decide to ‘opt out’; whereas unmarried couples will now
have the odd privilege of being able to choose (impliedly or expressly, orally or in writing) whether they wish to hold property
regularly or as ‘community property by analogy.’”165 Justice Springer
worried that the difference in how the law treated marital versus
160. Id.
161. See id. § 6.03 cmt. b (“As in marriage, in the ordinary case the law should provide
remedies at the dissolution of a domestic relationship that will ensure an equitable allocation of
accumulated property and of the financial losses arising from the termination of the relationship.”); see also id. § 6.02 cmt. a (stating that couples may avoid the consequences of the ALI
recommendations by an agreement to the contrary).
162. 840 P.2d 1220 (Nev. 1992).
163. Id. at 1229 (Springer, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
165. Id.
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nonmarital couples would induce some couples not to marry.166
The ALI recommendation removes the difficulty highlighted by
Justice Springer. Given that many states permit nonmarital couples
to make contracts governing the disposition of property acquired
during the relationship,167 adoption of the ALI recommendation
would remove the advantage Justice Springer finds so objectionable
since under the ALI recommendation both marital and nonmarital
couples would have to opt out to avoid the imposition of marital or
community property laws. Thus, one of the incentives in current law
not to marry would be removed by adoption of the ALI recommendation.
V. THE POTENTIAL FOR CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION
A different criticism of the ALI recommendation is that states
adopting it will promote conceptual confusion regarding what
counts as a marriage or a family. Yet, states already recognize nonmarital relationships without promoting confusion. Indeed, given
the contradictory justifications which have been offered to explain
why these relationships should not be recognized, the failure to recognize these relationships is what promotes the most confusion.
A. Existing Practices
The ALI recommendation is hardly as novel as might originally
be thought. States already recognize the existence of nonmarital cohabitant relationships and do not confuse such relationships with
marriages. The wisdom of refusing to extend more benefits to those
in nonmarital cohabitant relationships168 raises a separate question
that will not be discussed here, but it is quite clear that the recognition of such relationships by the courts has not resulted in conceptual conflation or confusion. Indeed, even when nonmarital partners
have received third-party benefits,169 they have received such benefits
out of equity rather than because the court could not differentiate

166. See id.
167. See Leonard Wagner, Note, Recognizing Contract and Property Rights of Unmarried
Cohabitants in Wisconsin: Watts v. Watts, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 1097–1102 (discussing
practices in different states).
168. Especially for same-sex couples, who do not have the option to marry.
169. See supra note 52 (discussing awarding state benefits to nonmarital partners).
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between marital and nonmarital partners.170
A related concern is that adoption of the ALI recommendation
will somehow increase confusion about what constitutes a “family.”
This concern is unfounded precisely because “family” is already a
rather inclusive term.171 For example, definitions of family have been
at issue in zoning cases, and individuals with no romantic or blood
relationships whatsoever have been defined as family.172 Given the
large variety of groups of individuals that have already been recognized in this country as constituting families,173 including singleparent households, blended families, adoptive families, families involving same-sex partners and their children, and so forth,174 adoption of the ALI recommendation will not change the understanding
of the groups of individuals to which that term can refer.
B. Prostitution and Gratuitous Services
Historically, courts have seemed the most confused when attempting to justify their refusal to recognize nonmarital relationships
or their refusal to enforce agreements between nonmarital domestic
partners. Courts sometimes refused to enforce such contracts because they viewed these contracts as cold-hearted agreements for
payment for sexual services,175 sometimes because such relationships
170. Sometimes, nonmarital partners receive third-party benefits because of a specific legislative enactment. Even in that situation, however, the courts and the legislature do not confuse who is married and who is not. See, e.g., Crawford v. City of Chicago, 710 N.E.2d 91, 98
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (“[N]othing in the DPO [Chicago’s Domestic Partners Ordinance] purports to create a marital status or marriage as those terms are commonly defined. Rather, the
DPO addresses only health benefits extended to City employees and those residing with
them.”).
171. Cf. Katz, supra note 153, at 1253 (“[F]amily law is the study of the establishment,
supervision, and termination or reorganization of family and family-like relationships like husband and wife, parent and child, and unrelated persons living with each other in a committed
relationship.”).
172. See, e.g., Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So. 2d 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(nuns); Robertson v. W. Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954) (nurses); Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 568 A.2d 888 (N.J. 1990) (students); Missionaries of Our
Lady of La Salette v. Vill. of Whitefish Bay, 66 N.W.2d 627 (Wis. 1954) (priests).
173. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (“The demographic changes of the
past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The composition of families varies greatly from household to household.”).
174. See Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families: Membership, Loving and
Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 286 (1992/1993) (discussing various types of families).
175. Compare Glasgo v. Glasgo, where the court reasoned:
We believe that it ill behooves courts to categorize either the Hewitts’ or the Glas-
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were viewed as involving love and a sense of duty and thus the services were presumed to have been performed gratuitously without
expectation of payment,176 and sometimes out of fear that the relationships would be viewed as indistinguishable from marriage if even
only limited benefits were conferred.177 Recently, courts have rejected that the cases before them involve meretricious or gratuitous
services and have upheld the distribution of the assets acquired during the nonmarital relationship.178
The point here should not be misunderstood. Insofar as an
agreement is construed as financial support in exchange for sexual
services, that agreement will be deemed void as against public policy
and hence unenforceable. As the Supreme Court of California made

gos’ relationships as “meretricious” or “illicit” in any sense of those terms. Such epithets should be reserved for cases in which they are deserved. There are still situations to which such terms apply, but this case is not one of them. Here the specific
facts which might give rise to a description of a meretricious relationship are conspicuously absent: the parties had been married formerly, they sought to rear their
children in a family setting, they conducted themselves for a significant period of
time as a conventional American family, the wife showed concern for her own and
her children’s future economic security. All the parties failed to do to conform to
societal norms of marital behavior was to complete the legal formalities. To apply
the traditional rationale denying recovery to one party in cases where contracts are
held to be void simply because illegal sexual relations are posited as consideration for
the bargain is unfair, unjust, and unduly harsh. Such unnecessary results probably do
more to discredit the legal system in the eyes of those who learn of the facts of the
case than to strengthen the institution of marriage or the moral fiber of our society.
To deny recovery to one party in such a relationship is in essence to unjustly enrich
the other.
410 N.E.2d 1325, 1330 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
176. See Roznowski v. Bozyk, 251 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (“Without proof
of the expectations of the parties, the presumption of gratuity will overcome the usual contract
implied by law to pay for what is accepted.”) (citing Weessies v. Van Dyke’s Estate, 123 N.W.
608, 610 (Mich. 1909)). York v. Place also explains:
[I]n the normal course of human affairs persons living together in a close relationship perform services for each other without expectation of payment. Payment in the
usual sense is not expected because the parties mutually care for each other’s needs.
Also because services are performed out of a feeling of affection or a sense of obligation, not for payment.
544 P.2d 572, 574 (Or. 1975).
177. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979) (“In our judgment the
fault in the appellate court holding in this case is that its practical effect is the reinstatement of
common law marriage.”).
178. Because these decisions did not involve third-party benefits, the courts have tended
to reject the argument that the distribution would thereby make the relationship between
nonmarital partners indistinguishable from marriage.
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clear in Marvin v. Marvin,179 “a contract between nonmarital partners is unenforceable only to the extent that it explicitly rests upon the
immoral and illicit consideration of meretricious sexual services.”180
Yet, a contract between cohabitants need not be for meretricious
sexual services, even if the contract is “expressly made in contemplation of a common living arrangement.”181 For example, even where
one of the parties works exclusively inside the home while the other
party works outside of the home,182 it would be inaccurate to claim
that financial support was being offered solely for sexual services,
since the individual working inside the home might perform a variety
of tasks such as cooking, cleaning, and child-rearing that are quite
distinct from the provision of sexual services183 and that a paid employee would have to perform if the partner in question were unwilling or unable to do the work. Thus, the Marvin court suggests that
“[a] promise to perform homemaking services is, of course, a lawful
and adequate consideration for a contract—otherwise those engaged
in domestic employment could not sue for their wages. . . .”184
Agreements between cohabitants that are not based on the provision of sexual services have been upheld whether or not the partners
179. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
180. Id. at 112; see also Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 146 (Mass. 1998) (A contract
between unmarried cohabitants “is subject to the rules of contract law and is valid even if expressly made in contemplation of a common living arrangement, except to the extent that sexual services constitute the only, or dominant consideration for the agreement.”); Kinnison v.
Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 595 (Wyo. 1981) (“Only when it is shown that such an agreement
has meretricious sexual services as its consideration will the court deny enforcement as being
against public policy.”).
181. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 114.
182. See, for example, Carlson v. Olson, where the court observed the nature of a nonmarital couple’s relationship:
The appellant Oral Olson and the respondent Laura Carlson began to live together
as husband and wife in October of 1955. At the time she was 22, and he was 31.
They lived together for 21 years, raised a son to majority, and acquired a modest
home and some personal property. They did not, however, ever legally marry, although they held themselves out to neighbors, friends, relatives, and the public as
husband and wife. During the relationship she did not work outside the home.
256 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Minn. 1977).
183. See Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923, 927 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc) (“Paul received the
cooking, cleaning and household chores he bargained for while Judy received monetary support. Together they were able to acquire property through their joint efforts. Clearly Judy’s
homemaking services can be valued and constituted adequate consideration for the couple’s
implied agreement.”).
184. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 113 n.5 (citing Taylor v. Taylor, 152 P.2d 480, 484 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1954)).

1162

11STR.DOC

1135]

12/5/01 2:27 AM

A Small Step Forward

were of the same sex.185 However, where courts find the services
themselves to be meretricious, they have refused to enforce the
agreements. Thus, for example, in Taylor v. Fields,186 the court held
that the provisions of sexual services was “an inseparable part of the
consideration for the agreement and render[ed] it unenforceable in
its entirety.”187
Courts should be commended for their willingness to enforce
contracts that are not solely based on the provision of meretricious
services. In many nonmarital cohabitation cases, the couple pooled
financial assets or each partner contributed to the couple’s financial
well-being by investing time, energy, and talents in a mutual business
or undertaking.188 The agreement in these cases obviously involves

185. See Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664 (Ariz. 1984) (agreement between members of different-sex couple remanded to determine if partnership existed); Bramlett v. Selman, 597
S.W.2d 80 (Ark. 1980) (agreement between members of same-sex couple upheld); Whorton v.
Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988) (agreement between members of same-sex
couple upheld); Silver v. Starrett, 674 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (agreement between
members of same-sex couple upheld); Kinnison, 627 P.2d at 595 (agreement between members of different-sex couple upheld); see also Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash.
1995) (en banc) (“We hold income and property acquired during a meretricious relationship
should be characterized in a similar manner as income and property acquired during marriage.”). But see Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
members of same-sex couple cannot have meretricious relationship because they cannot
marry), review granted 11 P.3d 825 (Wash. 2000).
186. 224 Cal. Rptr. 186 (Ct. App. 1986).
187. Id. at 193. A California appellate court reached a similar conclusion in Jones v. Daly,
176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 134 (Ct. App. 1981) (Plaintiff’s acting as the decedent’s lover “form[ed]
an inseparable part of the consideration for the agreement and render[ed] it unenforceable in
its entirety.”). A separate question is whether the court was correct that sexual services were an
inseparable part of the agreement. See, e.g., Kristin Bullock, Comment, Applying Marvin v.
Marvin to Same-Sex Couples: A Proposal for a Sex-Preference Neutral Cohabitation Contract
Statute, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029, 1046 (1992) (criticizing the D. Canale & Co. court for
“refus[ing] to sever any illegality conveyed by the terms ‘lover’ and ‘cohabiting mate’ from
Randal’s promises to be James’s housekeeper and cook”).
188. Consider Whorton, where the court discussed other contributions to a nonmarital
relationship:
When the parties began living together in 1977, they orally agreed that Whorton’s
exclusive, full-time occupation was to be Dillingham’s chauffeur, bodyguard, social
and business secretary, partner and counselor in real estate investments, and to appear on his behalf when requested. Whorton was to render labor, skills, and personal
services for the benefit of Dillingham’s business and investment endeavors. Additionally, Whorton was to be Dillingham’s constant companion, confidant, traveling
and social companion, and lover, to terminate his schooling upon obtaining his Associate in Arts degree, and to make no investment without first consulting Dillingham.
248 Cal. Rptr. at 406–07.
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more than meretricious services.
C. Another Weakness in the Contract Paradigm
The contract paradigm in which these relationships are viewed as
fee-for-service is problematic even where the court recognizes that
the “service” is not simply sexual. The members of the partnership
likely do not view their relationship in terms of an agreement for the
provision of services in exchange for pay. For example, rather than
envisioning one partner’s earning as tied to his or her cleaning the
toilets or washing the dishes, the parties likely view their relationship
as one in which each would help and support the other without that
help and support being tied to the provision of particular services.
Consider In re Estate of Alexander (Alexander v. Alexander)189 in
which the Mississippi Supreme Court had to decide whether a
woman who had lived with the decedent for thirty-three years190 was
entitled to any benefits. Margie Alexander “sought an ‘equitable lien
entitling her to full use and occupancy’ of the residence of Sam Alexander, deceased, for as long as Margie live[d] or occupie[d] the
property.”191 Although she and the deceased had lived together as if
they were married,192 they had never in fact married because she was
still married to someone else.193 She had never divorced because she
had not known where her husband was and had thought that she
could not divorce him without knowing his whereabouts.194
The court noted “the lack of evidence that the deceased, Sam
Alexander, knew of any expectation of Margie to be paid when he
accepted her services . . . [and the lack] of evidence that he accepted
her services under circumstances which indicate to a reasonable man
that her services were offered with the expectation of compensation.”195 Because there had been no agreement or understanding
that there would be payment for the services that had been provided
for more than three decades, the court denied recovery, notwith-

189. 445 So. 2d 836 (Miss. 1984).
190. See id. at 837.
191. Id.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 842 (Lee, J., dissenting) (“[H]er understanding was that she could not get a
divorce because she did not know the whereabouts of George.”).
195. Id. at 838.
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standing the sympathetic nature of her claim.196
In dissent, Justice Lee argued that requiring evidence of an
agreement for payment was inappropriate, stating that “the assertion
that there was no evidence that Margie expected to be paid for her
services or that Sam expected to pay her . . . amount[s] to nothing
more than a straw man set up for the purpose of knocking down
without having to give a true assessment of the couple’s relationship.”197 Indeed, Justice Lee argued that expectation of payment
would have been entirely inappropriate198 since “Margie and Sam
clearly considered themselves man and wife, sharing equally in both
their assets and liabilities.”199 Thus, precisely because Sam and
Margie had a domestic partnership rather than a business relationship, use of the contract model had a great potential for yielding inequitable results.
Various courts have suggested that it is simply inaccurate to infer
that cohabitation itself establishes an express200 or implied201 agreement to distribute the assets acquired during the relationship in a
particular way.202 Yet, a separate question is whether the nonexis-

196. See id. at 840 (“Margie’s claim naturally arouses our sympathy, but absent any evidence of ‘an implied obligation or contract’ the record before us fails to establish any proper
basis for relief to her.”).
197. Id. at 842 (Lee, J., dissenting).
198. See id. (“Of course there was no expectation of payment for services!”).
199. Id.
200. See Aehegma v. Aehegma, 797 P.2d 74, 79 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Boland v.
Catalano, 521 A.2d 142, 145 (Conn. 1987)) (“Cohabitation, no matter for how long, does
not by itself prove the existence of an express agreement for post-cohabitation rehabilitative
support or an equitable division of separate property acquired or improved during cohabitation.”).
201. See id. (citing Boland, 521 A.2d at 145) (“Cohabitation, no matter for how long,
does not by itself prove the existence of a contract implied-in-fact.”); see also Boland, 521 A.2d
at 145 (“We agree with the trial referee that cohabitation alone does not create any contractual
relationship or, unlike marriage, impose other legal duties upon the parties.”).
202. See Martin v. Coleman, 19 S.W.3d 757, 761–62 (Tenn. 2000) (rejecting distribution of retirement benefits to nonmarital cohabitant because “[i]n essence, we would be required to hold that unmarried couples may create an implied partnership simply by their continued cohabitation. We decline to do so.”).
For contrary analysis, see W. States Const., Inc. v. Michoff, where the court stated:
There is no evidence that the parties expressly agreed to hold their property as
though they were married. The district court erred in so finding. Nevertheless, we
conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding that
Lois and Max impliedly agreed to hold their property as though they were married.
In addition to living together and holding themselves out to be a married couple,
this evidence included the parties filing federal tax returns as husband and wife, the
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tence of such an agreement should preclude the distribution of assets
acquired during the relationship. As Justice Lee suggests and as some
courts have recognized, use of the contract model may be inappropriate in many domestic partnership cases precisely because it implicitly misrepresents the character of the relationship. The relationship
does not involve an agreement to pay for the provision of particular
services but, instead, is a relationship of mutual support based on
love and affection. By mischaracterizing the relationship as a contractual one for the provision of goods and services, a court may unfairly
preclude distribution of the assets and instead allow one of the parties to be unjustly enriched.203
D. Property and Support
One of the benefits of recognizing that these relationships are
not simply fee-for-service agreements is conceptual since doing so
more accurately reflects the nature of the relationship. Another benefit is practical in that courts will be less reluctant to order support in
certain kinds of deserving cases. The ALI proposal covers both the
division of property and the imposition of support obligations, but
doing the latter seems especially difficult to justify if one uses the feefor-service paradigm.
According to the ALI proposal, “property claims and support
obligations presumptively arise between persons who qualify as domestic partners, as they do between legal spouses, without inquiry
into each couple’s particular arrangements, except as the presumption is itself overcome by contract.”204 The property claims of domestic and marital partners are treated similarly in that, as a general

parties designating that they held the Western States stock as community property in
their Subchapter S election, and Max’s insistence that Lois sign a consent of spouse
to effectuate a partnership he wanted to enter.
840 P.2d 1220, 1224–25 (Nev. 1992).
203. The Lawlis court explains:
Thus, the protestations of Thompson that there was no understanding or promise in
respect to the moneys transferred to him is, under the theory of unjust enrichment,
irrelevant. Thompson asserts that only by agreement can there be a duty to make
restitution where the parties are cohabiting in a nonmarital relationship. As the
above decisions demonstrate, the making of an agreement is a concept entirely foreign to the quasi-contract concept of unjust enrichment and restitution. No agreement is needed.
Lawlis v. Thompson, 405 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Wis. 1987).
204. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. b.
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matter, “property is domestic-partnership property if it would be marital property . . . had the domestic partners been married to one another during the domestic partnership period.”205 While there is an exception to this provision,206 the recommendation basically subjects
property acquired during a domestic partnership to potential distribution in those circumstances in which property acquired during a
marriage would be so distributed. This part of the proposal reflects
the current practice of some states.207
The ALI recommendation regarding the treatment of property
will likely meet less resistance than its recommendation regarding the
treatment of support obligations since courts have manifested an
unwillingness to order alimony for a nonmarital cohabitant absent
explicit legislative authorization.208 The Mississippi Supreme Court
explained in Chrismond v. Chrismond 209 that “permanent alimony
can only be allowed where the relation of husband and wife has existed, but this rule does not preclude an equitable division of property where there is a judicial separation of the parties on account of
the invalidity of the marriage contract.”210 Thus, courts might be less
open to ordering support than to distributing property when nonmarital partners separate, although some courts, including the Mississippi Supreme Court, have found that requiring periodic payments
not classified as alimony to former nonmarital partners is permissible
under certain circumstances.211
205. Id. § 6.04(1).
206. See id. § 6.04(3) (“Property that would be recharacterized as marital property under
§ 4.18 if the parties had been married, is not domestic-partnership property.”).
Compare Connell v. Francisco, where the court held:
Therefore, property owned by one of the parties prior to the meretricious relationship and property acquired during the meretricious relationship by gift, bequest, devise, or descent with the rents, issues and profits thereof, is not before the court for
division. All other property acquired during the relationship would be presumed to
be owned by both of the parties.
898 P.2d 831, 836–37 (Wash. 1995) (en banc).
207. See Connell, 898 P.2d at 836 (“We hold income and property acquired during a
meretricious relationship should be characterized in a similar manner as income and property
acquired during marriage. Therefore, all property acquired during a meretricious relationship is
presumed to be owned by both parties. This presumption can be rebutted.”).
208. See, e.g., Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 873 (Miss. 1986) (“Because we afford
common law marriages no recognition, there is in our law no authority to award alimony in
any such [nonmarital] setting.”).
209. 52 So. 2d 624 (Miss. 1951).
210. Id. at 629 (citing Fuller v. Fuller, 7 P. 241 (Kan. 1885)).
211. In Taylor v. Taylor, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld an award of $75 per
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Ironically, the refusal to impose support payments may result
from an inaccurate construction of legislative intent. Presumably,
when a legislature suggests that a court may order alimony for marital spouses, the legislature is not suggesting that a contract in which
one nonmarital party promises to make periodic payments to another
party would be void because it violates public policy. Rather, the legislature is more plausibly interpreted to be taking one of two approaches. Either the legislature simply is not taking a position on the
appropriateness of ordering such support when nonmarital partners
separate, or the legislature feels that ordering support is inappropriate absent some previous agreement to that effect.
Consider Crowe v. DeGioia,212 in which the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant had promised her that “he would take care of her and
support her for the rest of her life, and that he would share with her
his various assets.”213 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff was not entitled to alimony214 because “the power of a court
to award alimony is purely statutory, and alimony may be awarded
only in a matrimonial action for divorce or nullity,”215 but the plaintiff was nonetheless entitled to support.216 A contractual agreement
to support someone for his or her entire life,217 even when enforced,
month for thirty-six months as support, as distinguished from alimony. See 17 So. 2d 422, 422
(Miss. 1975); see also id. at 422–23 (affirming previous holding that there is no foundation for
alimony without a valid marriage).
212. 447 A.2d 173 (N.J. 1982).
213. Id. at 175.
In Thomas v. LaRosa, the nonmarital partners divided the family responsibilities in a
similar way:
According to the complaint, in August, 1980, the parties became acquainted while
both were living in Clarksburg, West Virginia. Thereafter, during the Spring of
1981, appellant and appellee agreed that they would hold themselves out and act as
husband and wife. It was further agreed that appellant would perform valuable services for appellee, including being his companion, housekeeper, confidante and
business helper. In consideration of the valuable services and obligations undertaken
and performed by appellant, appellee promised and agreed to provide financial security for appellant for her lifetime and to educate appellant’s children. Appellee carried out such agreement for approximately eight years, but now has breached and
reneged.
400 S.E.2d 809, 810 (W. Va. 1990).
214. See Crowe, 447 A.2d at 176.
215. Id. (citing O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 96 A.2d 410 (N.J. 1953)).
216. See id. at 178.
217. The Whorton court explained:
In consideration of Whorton’s promises, Dillingham was to give him a one-half equity interest in all real estate acquired in their joint names, and in all property there-
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is not alimony and thus should not be exclusively for marital partners.
Basic contract law justifies a court’s ordering support payments
where one of the nonmarital partners had explicitly promised the
other that those payments would be made.218 The ALI recommendaafter acquired by Dillingham. Dillingham agreed to financially support Whorton for
life, and to open bank accounts, maintain a positive balance in those accounts, grant
Whorton invasionary powers to savings accounts held in Dillingham’s name, and
permit Whorton to charge on Dillingham’s personal accounts. Dillingham was also
to engage in a homosexual relationship with Whorton. Importantly, for the purpose
of our analysis, the parties specifically agreed that any portion of the agreement
found to be legally unenforceable was severable and the balance of the provisions
would remain in full force and effect.
Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407 (Ct. App. 1988).
218. There is some question as to whether the statute of frauds applies in these kinds of
situations. In some states, an agreement to take care of another individual for the rest of his or
her life will not be enforceable unless reduced to a writing. For example, the Alaskan statute
provides:
In the following cases and under the following conditions an agreement, promise, or
undertaking is unenforceable unless it or some note or memorandum of it is in writing and subscribed by the party charged or by an agent of that party:
(1) an agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making of it;
(2) an agreement the performance of which is not to be completed by the end of a
lifetime . . . .
ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010 (Michie 2000); see also Laboulais v. Cohade, 236 N.Y.S.2d 166,
167 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (“plaintiff alleges . . . that defendants agreed to provide a home and to
furnish care for plaintiff for the rest of his life and to tend him in his old age.”); id. at 168
(“Since performance of the oral contract was not to be completed before the end of a lifetime,
it was void under the Statute of Frauds.”). However, exceptions to the completed-before-theend-of-a-lifetime rule exist. The Alaska statute further provides:
A contract, promise, or agreement that is subject to [ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010],
that does not satisfy the requirements of that section, but that is otherwise valid is
enforceable if
(1) there has been full performance on one side accepted by the other in accordance
with the contract; . . .
(4) the party against whom enforcement is sought admits, voluntarily or involuntarily, in pleadings or at any other stage of this or any other action or proceeding the
making of an agreement.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.020 (Michie 2000). See also Hall v. Hall, where the court stated:
Exceptions “taking the case out of the statute” have traditionally been recognized as
to all statute of frauds provisions. Thus, a substantial change of position in reliance
on an oral agreement will estop reliance on the statute (1 Witkin, Summary of California Law (9th ed. 1987) Contracts, § 325, pp. 305–06), and an actual transfer of
realty constituting partial performance of the oral agreement will satisfy the proof
element otherwise reflected in the requirement of a writing. (Id. at §§ 318–19, pp.
299–301.)
271 Cal. Rptr. 773, 777 (Ct. App. 1990); Brown v. Phillips, 330 So. 2d 510, 512 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1976) (“Lastly, we point out that appellees have raised the statute of frauds as a basis
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tion goes farther than that, however. The ALI is recommending that
domestic partners receive support in some cases in which either (1)
partner support might be inferred to have been part of the bargain,
or (2) periodic payments might be a distribution of property rather
than an award of spousal support.
A few points are in order about this recommendation. First,
adoption of the ALI proposal might induce some to marry who otherwise would not. For example, some people might refuse to marry
because they thought that in the event of a break-up they would be
less likely to be ordered to pay support were they merely to have
lived with their partners than if they had married them. By removing
this incentive not to marry, the ALI support proposal may in fact
promote marriage.
Second, a court might adopt the ALI recommendation with respect to the distribution of property but wait for the legislature to
authorize the court’s ordering support for a nonmarital partner.219
The court might justify this position by suggesting that because the
power to award partner or spousal support is purely statutory,220 this
matter is particularly appropriate to be left to the state legislature.221
Third, precisely because a court’s refusal to order support until
authorized by the legislature to do so might produce inequitable results and might, as a public policy matter, provide a disincentive to
marry, courts might decide not to wait for the legislature to act. The
courts might instead decide to order distributions of property and
nonmarital partner support as well, reasoning that the legislature’s
failure to address the provision did not amount to a legislative prohi-

for affirmance. The performance on the part of appellant by execution of the deed takes this
transaction out of the statute of frauds.”). Of course, in some states, such oral agreements will
not be subject to the statute of frauds as long as they could be completed within a year. See,
e.g., Young v. Ward, 917 S.W.2d 506, 510 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (“[A]greements to last during the lifetime of one of the parties would also not require a writing because the party upon
whose life the duration of the contract is measured could die within a year of the agreement’s
making.”); Cannon v. Harris, 166 P.2d 998, 999 (Kan. 1946) (“[T]he parol agreement
whereby Robinson agreed to permit Mrs. Cannon to occupy the real estate as long as she lived
was capable of being fully performed within one year and was not in violation of the statute of
frauds.”).
219. See Davis v. Davis, 643 So. 2d 931, 932 (Miss. 1994) (“[T]he endorsement of any
form of ‘palimony’ is a task for the legislature and not this court . . . .”).
220. See Crowe v. DeGioia, 447 A.2d 173, 176 (N.J. 1982) (citing O’Loughlin v.
O’Loughlin, 96 A.2d 410 (N.J. 1953)) (“The power of a court to award alimony is purely
statutory, and alimony may be awarded only in a matrimonial action for divorce or nullity.”).
221. See Davis, 643 So. 2d at 932.
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bition of support orders for nonmarital partners but merely a legislative decision not to express a view with respect to the appropriateness of such orders.
E. Adulterous Relationships
The ALI recommendation that the domestic partnership relationship be recognized even if one of the parties is married will likely
arouse controversy. In Thomas v. LaRosa,222 the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia refused to enforce an agreement between
domestic partners for future support,223 notwithstanding the court’s
having enforced an agreement between domestic partners earlier that
same year.224 The court suggested that the cases were easily distinguishable because in this case, unlike the other, one of the parties
was already married.225 The court seemed to have two worries in
mind: (1) the rights of the innocent spouse might be affected,226 and
(2) the enforcement of “such a contract when one party is already
married would amount to the condonation of bigamy . . . .”227
Neither worry should prevent adoption of the ALI recommenda222. 400 S.E.2d 809 (W. Va. 1990).
223. See id. at 815.
224. See id. at 811.
225. See id. at 811–12. Justice Miller concurred by reasoning:
I concur in the result reached by the majority that Mr. LaRosa is not subject to the
financial claims of Karen J. Thomas because Mr. LaRosa is a married person. . . .
Were Mr. LaRosa not married, I believe the certified question would be answered in
the affirmative. Ms. Thomas’s suit would survive the motion to dismiss and the
question would then be the proof of the agreement and whether there was in fact an
independent basis for the contractual considerations that were not meretricious.
Id. at 815.
226. See id. at 814 (“Although it is alleged that Mr. LaRosa is a man of immense wealth,
continuing obligations of support to a woman who is essentially a second wife must, ipso facto,
prejudice the rights of a lawful wife and her legitimate children.”); see also id. at 812 (noting
that in the previous case, Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990), the court had cautioned that “if either the man or woman is validly married to another person during the period
of cohabitation, the property rights of the spouse and support rights of the children of such
man or woman shall not in any way be adversely affected by such division of property.”).
227. Id. at 814. But see Donovan v. Scuderi, where the court observed:
Whether an agreement is reached as the result of ego, braggadocio, love, kindness or
affection does not affect the validity of a contract. Nor is it unenforceable because
the contract may never have been struck, ‘but for’ the relationship, even if proven
adulterous. That relationship does not disable parties from making an enforceable
contract with each other so long as it does not stand or fall upon the sexual relationship.
443 A.2d 121, 127 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
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tion. The first is specifically addressed by the recommendation itself,228 since the ALI has made clear that the innocent spouse’s property rights will take priority over the claims of the domestic partner.
The second worry is simply unfounded. The ALI neither condones
nor promotes bigamy or adultery229 (and states criminalizing such
conduct might still prosecute the parties). However, the ALI does
recognize that the failure to permit a domestic partner to recover
even after an adulterous relationship may do nothing to protect marriage230 and may only result in “excessively harsh” consequences. 231
VI. CONCLUSION
The ALI recommendation is intended to promote equity and,
secondarily, to save the states’ money. Adoption of the recommendation would neither destroy marriage nor revive common law marriage. In fact, courts that have distributed property acquired during
domestic partnerships have made quite clear that their jurisdictions
did not recognize common law marriage232 and that they were not
interested in converting their jurisdictions to “common law marriage

228. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01 cmt. c (“The rule of
Paragraph (5) defers fully to the claims of a spouse, but allows claims of a domestic partner to
the extent that they would not displace those of a spouse.”).
229. See Collins v. Davis, 315 S.E.2d 759, 762–63 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (Braswell, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that individual in adulterous relationship should not be permitted to
use the courts to enforce agreement with her partner when she knew that her partner was married to someone else).
230. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 6.01 cmt. d (discussing the individual who marries in good faith, later learns that the partner is already married to
someone else, but at that point is not in a position to leave the putative marriage).
231. Id. § 6.01 cmt. d.
232. See, e.g., Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 875 (Miss. 1986) (“We begin with the
undisputed: that the legal relationship of husband and wife may be created only in conformity
with the procedures authorized by the statute law of this state. Cohabitation which had not
ripened into a common law marriage prior to April 5, 1956, is wholly ineffective to vest marital
rights in either party thereto.”); Joan S. v. John S., 427 A.2d 498, 499 (N.H. 1981) (“New
Hampshire is a jurisdiction which does not recognize the validity of common law marriages . . .
except to the limited extent provided by [statute].” (citation omitted)); Martin v. Coleman, 19
S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tenn. 2000) (“In Tennessee, marriage is controlled by statute, and common-law marriages are not recognized.” (citing Crawford v. Crawford, 277 S.W.2d 389, 391
(Tenn. 1955)); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 435 (W. Va. 1990) (“Accordingly, we hold
that pursuant to the statutory requirements . . . every marriage in this state must be solemnized
under a license. Therefore, the validity of a common-law marriage is not recognized.”); Kinnison v. Kinnison, 627 P.2d 594, 595 (Wyo. 1981) (“Wyoming does not recognize the doctrine
of common-law marriage.”).
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state[s] by the back door.”233 While eschewing the reintroduction of
common law marriage, however, courts and the ALI have also recognized that the failure to distribute property acquired during a domestic partnership may produce great unfairness. In many cases,
“[t]o deny recovery to one party in such a relationship is in essence
to unjustly enrich the other.”234
The ALI recommendation is not without fault. For example,
fairness and equity would be promoted even more were the ALI to
recommend that third parties accord benefits to domestic partners.
The gains in fairness and equity would more than offset the diminution in the material differences between marital and nonmarital relationships, and the symbolic differences between the two types of relationships would still distinguish the relationships in the eyes of the
public. In addition, many of the societal interests promoted by
granting benefits to marital partners would also be promoted by
granting them to domestic partners, especially to same-sex partners
who cannot enter into a marriage-like relationship in any state but
Vermont. Another difficulty is that the ALI goes too far when not
allowing the intentions of the parties to prevail in certain circumstances. Where it was clear, for example, that the parties had orally
agreed to opt out of the system recommended by the ALI, it would
make sense to permit their wishes to prevail, lack of writing notwithstanding.235 Finally, the ALI has failed to specify how the assets of a
domestic partnership should be distributed when one of the parties
in such a relationship dies. The ALI should recommend that the
analogous protections be in place when such relationships end due to
the death of one or both of the parties, since fairness and equity
should be promoted under these circumstances as well. Nonetheless,
because adoption of the recommendation will not destroy marriage
or the family, will produce more equitable results in many cases, and
will help prevent some of the horror stories that might otherwise occur, its adoption would have many advantages and deserves serious
consideration.

233. Shuraleff v. Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764, 769 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
234. Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1330 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
235. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 1, § 7.05(1) (“An agreement is
not enforceable if it is not set forth in a writing signed by both parties.”).
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